




Introduction: The Heroic Narrative and the Poverty of Unjust Enrichment 
In class actions filed in the last years of the 20th century, Holocaust survivors sought 
remedy in American federal courts for damages suffered as slave laborers over fifty years earlier.  
Some also tried to recover identifiable assets such as sequestered bank accounts, looted artwork, 
or other converted property.  Lawyers for the plaintiffs1 and legal scholars2 have contributed to a 
heroic narrative of this litigation and praised it as a model for international human rights torts.  
Professor Burt Neuborne,3 a key plaintiff’s attorney, extolled an era of “Lex Americana” in 
which multinational corporations (MNCs) have a “moral obligation … to live by American rules 
of fundamental fairness, both substantive and procedural, if they wish to participate in the 
remarkable success of this economic, social, and political culture."4  Professor Michael Bazyler 
is equally enthusiastic: “American law … has become Lex Americana, imitated throughout the 
world, with the Holocaust restitution cases becoming the principal model for victims and their 
representatives seeking to right past wrongs.”5 
In the past, international law would have relegated issues of compensation for wrongs 
incident to a global conflict like World War II to states parties;6 governments would have settled 
through negotiations; and individuals would have had little recourse except through petitions 
directed at their State Departments or Foreign Offices, assuming they were not stateless persons.   
In the Holocaust-era suits, however, activists and litigators teamed up with victims, some of 
them aliens, to vindicate the rights of individuals by acting directly through domestic U.S. courts.  
Their lawsuits prompted the U.S. government as well as Germany to push private MNCs toward 
2 
 
large settlements, an example of what Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco have identified as 
“Plaintiff’s Diplomacy.”7  In Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, individuals use lawsuits to directly shape the 
foreign affairs of states and bypass the traditional political branches. 
Yet this article argues that the political branches contributed more to successful 
settlements than plaintiff’s diplomacy through litigation.  It contributes to existing scholarship in 
two ways.  First, it displaces the emphasis of Neuborne and Bazyler on heroic litigation and 
instead underscores the survivors’ successful mobilization of political support.  The role of states 
parties remained paramount.  Second, the article undertakes an original analysis of the survivors’ 
claims, sounding mostly in restitution.  Because of the large settlements of the 1990s, it is often 
taken for granted that these claims were strong.8  But they were actually weak.  Legal scholars 
have not probed the merits of the restitution theories at the heart of the Holocaust-era lawsuits in 
any meaningful way.9  And no legal scholar has analyzed the historical evidence upon which 
they rested.10  The article concludes that legal theories of restitution offer little promise for future 
human-rights suits. 
Regardless of weaknesses in their legal theories, however, the plaintiffs achieved 
extraordinary success by any measure.  Swiss banks agreed to pay $1.25 billion.  Litigation 
against German corporations eventually ended in an Executive Agreement between the United 
States and Germany establishing the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future” 
(German Foundation).  This foundation oversaw a fund of 10 billion Deutschmark (between $4.8 
and $5.2 billion, depending upon fluctuating exchange rates) to be paid to survivors of Nazi 
slave labor as well as those who held Nazi-era insurance claims.11  Austrian, French, and Italian 
banks reached smaller settlements.12 
3 
 
The publicity surrounding the litigation—including controversy surrounding lawyers’ 
fees13—has obscured what, if anything, was truly innovative about the lawsuits.  What law or 
transnational process did the class actions actually advance?  In particular, how did the 
Holocaust-era litigation contribute to ongoing efforts to hold MNCs liable for human rights 
violations in American courts?  This article concludes that the Holocaust-era litigation represents 
more of a cul-de-sac than an Appian Way to an era of Lex Americana. 
Section I briefly reviews Holocaust-era litigation in U.S. federal courts before the 
spectacular successes of the late 1990s, ground covered in detail by Michael Bazyler.14  Bazyler 
identifies the beginning of a “modern era of Holocaust assets litigation” with the Swiss bank 
lawsuits of the 1990s,15 because these were “the first Holocaust-era case[s] to reach the 
settlement stage.”16  Thus, Bazyler stresses discontinuity but unfortunately gives little analysis.  
Presumably, all preceding lawsuits belonged to a “premodern” era, yet why is not clear.  Suits 
before the cluster of Swiss bank cases also ended in settlement; and plaintiffs had attempted class 
actions before the 1990s as well.17 
Instead of distinguishing a “modern” and “pre-modern” era, this article emphasizes 
continuity.  Holocaust survivors have repeatedly raised the same types of claims, primarily 
sounding in restitution.  They have usually sought to recover converted property and assets or the 
value of their slave labor in quantum meruit.  In addition, they have sought to recover for 
ordinary torts like wrongful death or assault.  Section I explores these claims in several 
exemplary cases as well as the reasons why they repeatedly failed.  Judge Korman emphasized 
this in a fairness hearing with the Swiss bank litigants when he warned that “those objectors who 
believe that strong moral claims are easily converted into successful legal causes of action” 
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potentially needed a “reality check.”18  Courts almost invariably dismissed Holocaust-era suits 
on the pleadings.   
Nevertheless, although dismissal was the norm, the few successes illustrate an additional 
common thread.  Powerful support from the political branches of government, rather than 
meritorious restitution claims, provided the key ingredient to success.  What Bazyler calls the 
“modern era” did not differ from any previous era in this regard. 
Section II discusses the legal and factual reasons for the weakness of the plaintiffs’ 
claims, which generally fell in two categories.  First, most had credible claims in quantum meruit 
as former slave laborers for various MNCs.  Quantum meruit is also referred to as “quasi-
contract” because courts may imply a labor contract and award damages for the (implied) breach 
of non-payment.  Were there an express contract, this would actually be expectation damages for 
lost wages, a damage suffered by the worker, who may still recover wages regardless of whether 
employers have squandered the value of labor or not.19  This is not equivalent to the restitution of 
an enrichment.  Restitution for wrongful enrichment, at the name implies, returns to plaintiffs a 
benefit enjoyed by the defendant.   
Quantum Meruit conveys no right to profits, however.  It is also subject to numerous 
defenses explored in Section II.  In 1999, the New Jersey District Court dismissed the first 
quantum meruit claim in what Bazyler calls the “modern era” on the ground that the statute of 
limitations had run.20  MNCs had many additional defenses available.  This section also 
calculates the probable recovery in quantum meruit based upon historical evidence of World-
War-II-era wages in Germany.  The numbers are considerable, but the lion’s share is due to the 
time value of money.  If not for accrued interest on backed wages during the fifty intervening 
years, recovery would have been very modest. 
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The second category of survivors’ claims sounded in wrongful enrichment, a more 
tenuous theory.  But plaintiffs hoped to use it to recover the profits of MNCs.  This article adopts 
the distinction between “wrongful” and “unjust” enrichments that Cambridge Professor Peter 
Birks has sought to establish.21  In American courts, the conflation of unjust enrichment, 
wrongful enrichment, quasi contract, and quantum meruit is not uncommon.22  Nevertheless, 
Birks’ terminology helps distinguish the survivors’ claims from other, more common 
restitutionary claims.23  For Birks, the archetypal example of an “unjust enrichment” is the 
mistaken payment.24  Turpitude does not attach to such mistakes, and they convey only a right to 
recover the fair-market value of benefits conferred.25  By contrast, “wrongful enrichments” arise 
exclusively out of wrongs, whether tortious, criminal, or merely based in willful breach of 
contract.26  The common law expresses disapproval by extending recovery beyond the fair value 
of the benefit and may authorize the disgorgement of profits, whichever is more.27 
The potential to recover profits made wrongful enrichment attractive to Holocaust 
survivors.  It seemed self-evident that MNCs’ had engorged their balance sheets by using unpaid 
slave laborers who worked six-day weeks and often 11 hours a day.  Wrongful enrichment 
seemed to offer a suitable cause of action to recover ill-gotten gains.  It is easy to confuse this 
claim with quantum meruit because most survivors argued that the wrong giving rise to the 
enrichment was slave labor.28  But quantum meruit merely gave rise to a claim for lost wages 
arising from the work, whereas wrongful enrichment arose out of illegal exploitation.  In the 
latter, the right to recover arose out of the wrong, not out of the act of labor. 
Neuborne testified before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on 
September 14th, 1999: 
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Imagine the economic benefit to a wartime economy of being relieved from the 
obligation of paying wages to more than 50% of your labor force.  The fruits … 
were realized in enormous wartime profits, most of which was paid out to large 
shareholders as dividends, much of it was reinvested in capital equipment that 
paved the way for postwar corporate profitability.29 
Here, Neuborne far exceeded any accusation leveled at a single MNC defendant.  He and his 
clients asserted that lucre gained in the Holocaust had catapulted Europe’s leading economy into 
its subsequent prosperity.30  The victims wished to lay claim to this enrichment. 
Yet, contrary to common perception, slave labor was not particularly profitable, and there 
can be no recovery in wrongful enrichment without enrichment.  As opposed to quantum meruit, 
it provides no cause of action for (implied) damages.  In the end, little historical evidence 
suggests that the gross human rights violations of the Holocaust produced enormous gains for 
MNCs, and no evidence suggests that this was the root cause of Germany’s post-war economic 
boom.  Plaintiff’s lawyer Melvin Weiss was surely correct to condemn “profit-motivated 
complicity in the Nazi regime.”31  Cupidity and avarice abounded in the Third Reich.32  As a 
macroeconomic system, however, the Holocaust was a fiscal bust, far more destructive of 
productive capacity than the plaintiffs’ theories of wrongful enrichment imply. 
Furthermore, to suggest that German industry engorged itself on Holocaust profits 
fundamentally misunderstands gross violations of human rights, which rarely follow the profit 
motive.  The Nazis did not act primarily in pursuit of profit; rather they pursued an ideologically-
driven racial supremacy.33  Both can and could be pursued at the same time, but in Nazi 
Germany there was a clear primacy of politics.34  Hitler did believe that the dividends of slavery 
would “exceed by far the debts of the Reich,”35 but this says more about his ignorance of 
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macroeconomics than it does about the German war economy.  The Nazis enslaved, tortured, and 
murdered the Jews because they were Jews; they starved and enslaved the Slavs of Eastern 
Europe because Hitler embarked upon a war of racial-supremacist imperialism.  Theories of 
wrongful enrichment will most likely fail in the face of destructive ideological crimes because 
there is little profit to restitute. 
Section III highlights the limited contribution that shaky legal claims and tenuous 
litigation made to the billion-dollar settlements of the late 1990s.  It points out that larger 
transnational legal processes provided the key to success, sometimes working with and 
sometimes despite the lawsuits.  NGOs such as the World Jewish Congress collaborated with the 
U.S. Commerce Department to initiate the Swiss Bank settlement in advance of any litigation.  
The German Foundation would not exist without the intervention of the U.S. State Department, 
the House, and Senate, not to mention the sympathetic partner the Clinton administration found 
in German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.   
Michael Bazyler has argued that “the ‘one-two punch’ of American lawyers first filing 
the class action lawsuits against the European defendants [MNCs] and American officials at the 
state and local levels then threatening to exclude the defendants from profitable U.S. [business] 
deals … was the perfect strategy…"36  This captures the importance of transnational process but 
only hints at the variety of players involved.37  As Bazyler’s own careful research shows, 
diplomatic negotiations and the initiatives of NGOs sparked the litigation, not vice versa.38 
Section IV traces theories of wrongful enrichment in subsequent international human 
rights litigation against MNCs.  The repeated failure or irrelevance of these theories 
demonstrates that neither lawyers nor plaintiffs have gained much by modeling their suits on the 
Holocaust-era litigation.  To prevail, plaintiffs wishing to hold MNCs accountable for 
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participation in gross human rights violations must ultimately employ theories that fit the typical 
fact patterns of those violations.  Theories of remedy based upon restitution offer little to victims 
in the face of predominantly ideological crimes. 
Section I: Diplomacy and Holocaust Litigation in U.S. Courts 
As Michael Bazyler has detailed, Holocaust survivors sought justice in U.S. courts long 
before the lawsuits of the late 1990s.  Victims sued to recover stolen and converted assets even 
before the end of World War II.39  Arnold Bernstein filed the most significant early suit in 1946, 
discussed in subsection (a) below.  Bernstein, a German-Jewish entrepreneur who immigrated to 
the United States, had owned and operated various shipping companies.40  Although he could not 
initially prevail in U.S. courts, the State Department intervened and enabled him to proceed to 
settlement. 
Bernstein set the broad pattern for all future Holocaust litigation.  If litigants secured 
support from the Executive, Congress, or both, they frequently gained the leverage needed to 
prompt defendants to settle.  Without help from the political branches, however, most suits met 
with speedy dismissal.  The first class action brought by Holocaust survivors, Kelberine v. 
Societe Internationale, 363 F. 2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1966), is discussed in subsection (b) and 
exemplifies a failed suit that lacked political support.  Finally, subsection (c) discusses the 
survivor Hugo Princz’s suit against the Federal Republic of Germany, Princz v. FRG,  26 F.3d 
1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir., 1994).  Princz’s experience in many ways recapitulated that of Arnold 
Bernstein forty years earlier.  Princz first failed at the pleadings stage, but he  received restitution 
in a settlement negotiated between Germany and the United States after the political branches 
took up his cause. 
9 
 
(a) Bernstein’s Cases 
The Gestapo arrested Arnold Bernstein in 1937, tortured him, beat him, and threatened 
his life.  His treatment was typical of the early phases of what the Nazis called “Aryanization,” a 
policy of eradicating any Jewish presence in German economic life.  Nazi policy aimed first to 
strip Jews of their property and compel them to immigrate.  Before 1938 the authorities did not 
typically murder and plunder the Jews outright but coerced them to sell their assets to Germans.  
Extortion was the rule, with a veneer of legality.41  Thus, after threatening Bernstein, the Gestapo 
had a certain Marius Boeger pose as someone willing to render him assistance, and Bernstein 
signed away his companies under severe duress.42   
If Bernstein’s plight was typical of “Aryanization,” his first lawsuit in US courts several 
years later was surprising because it did not target German companies or Boeger but rather the 
Belgian and Dutch shipping lines that had eventually acquired the converted assets.  Bernstein 
filed his first claim against Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme.43  Thus, from the start, 
Holocaust-era suits targeted MNCs that had opportunistically dealt with the Nazis at the expense 
of Jews and other victims.  Bernstein alleged that Van Heyghen acquired his assets with full 
knowledge of his duress, and he appeared to have a solid case for wrongful enrichment linked to 
identifiable assets.44 
The basic principle of restitution appeals to common sense: “a person who has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.”45  
Nevertheless, legal scholars generally acknowledge that restitution law is unsettled at best, 
prompting John Dawson to quote Lord Justice Scutton, “[T]he whole history of this particular 
form of action has been what I may call a history of well-meaning sloppiness of thought.”46  
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Claims sounding in restitution are generally weaker and more difficult to sustain than in contract 
or tort.47   
Some legal scholars argue that restitution should be available to serve “rough justice” 
when judges wish to find for a plaintiff or punish a defendant but can find no orthodox doctrine 
of law to justify doing so.  This view has not received widespread support, and others condemn it 
as a thinly veiled argument for uninhibited judicial discretion.48  Restitution is not punitive; it 
merely serves to restore misappropriated gains.49  The “unjust” in “unjust enrichment” usually 
refers to nothing more than a misappropriation, thus the distinction made in this paper between 
“unjust” and “wrongful” enrichment. 
Restitution seldom allows plaintiffs to recover anything in excess of the fair-market value 
of tangible benefits they have conferred to the defendant.  Theoretically, wrongful enrichment 
can provide an exception to this general rule, following the principle that wrongdoers should not 
retain ill-gotten gains from their wrongs.  For example, in Bernstein’s case in which the wrong 
involved duress, blackletter restitution law holds that plaintiffs may recover either the market 
value of the benefit conferred or the wrongdoer’s profit, whichever is more.50  Wrongful 
enrichment may also entitle a plaintiff to recover specific assets in rem. 51  Yet judges do not 
necessarily follow the blackletter doctrine.  Upon surveying the common law in 1981, Dawson 
found that plaintiffs typically could recover nothing more than the measurable benefit they had 
conveyed.  Contrary to the Restatement (First) of Restitution (1937) and regardless of 
defendants’ conscious wrongdoing, Dawson argued that "profit will be awarded, if it is, because 
it has been shown, and to the extent it is shown, that the [plaintiff’s] interest invaded [by the 
defendant] contributed to producing the profit."52 
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Bernstien’s case illustrates some of the limits of restitutionary claims to profits.  He 
satisfied the basic elements of a wrongful enrichment.  Van Heyghen did not dispute that the 
Nazis had unjustly appropriated Bernstein’s shipping lines by duress or that he had suffered 
impoverishment.  Nor did Van Heyghen deny that it benefitted from the appropriation of those 
assets.  Bernstein sued to reclaim his ships; to recover Van Heyghen’s profits; and, as one ship 
had sunk during the course of the war, to recover the insurance proceeds that a third party held 
on behalf of Van Heyghen.53   
Even if Bernstein had prevailed, however, he would have gained only the right to profits 
directly linked to assets of the Arnold Bernstein Line.54  Had the claim survived dismissal, Van 
Heyghen would have also had numerous defenses available.  Van Heyghen could have asserted a 
“change of position” defense: that the company actually made no profit or suffered a net loss (as 
is often the case when an asset is destroyed, like Bernstein’s sunken ship).  Unjust enrichment 
liabilities are generally reduced to the amount of enrichment remaining with the defendant, and 
courts treat wrongful enrichments in the same way.55  For instance, Van Heyghens could have 
sought to deduct any improvement it had made to the ships.56  If defendants realize much greater 
earnings than a plaintiff could have made if the wrongly appropriated asset had never been lost, 
they may claim a “proportional accounting.”  Even in a wrongful enrichment, “proportional 
accounting” entitles defendants to retain profits attributable to their skill, entrepreneurial savvy, 
or independent investments.57  These defenses seem to have been dubious in Van Heyghen’s 
case, based upon Bernstein’s allegations, but many MNC defendants in the Holocaust-era 
litigation might have prevailed on the merits of “change of position” or “proportional 
accounting” defenses, as will be shown below. 
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Bernstein’s case did not reach the merits of his restitutionary claims in either the trial 
court or the Second Circuit.  Instead, Judge Learned Hand affirmed dismissal based on the Act of 
State Doctrine.  The court condemned the Nazi state as “universally execrable” and noted that it 
had perished in a ruinous total war,58 but Germany had caused Bernstein’s harm by acting in its 
sovereign capacity through its agent, the Gestapo.  U.S. courts would not condemn “the validity 
under the municipal law of another state of the acts of officials of that state, purporting to act as 
such.”59  Judge Hand appeared uneasy with the Act of State Doctrine, and seemed to invite the 
intervention of the Supreme Court, “... if we have been mistaken, the Supreme Court must 
correct it.”60  His opinion also stated that, in such cases, the court should entertain statements of 
intent from the Executive: “ … the only relevant consideration is how far our Executive has 
indicated any positive intent to relax the doctrine that our courts shall not entertain actions of the 
kind at bar; some positive evidence of such an intent being necessary."61  In the absence of the 
Executive’s express consent to an exception to the Act of State Doctrine, the court held that 
Bernstein’s case was a matter of reparations properly settled by treaty law.62 
At the time of Bernstein’s first appeal, he had not secured the political branches’ support, 
but this changed two years later in an almost identical lawsuit against the Holland America 
Line.63  Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the U.S. State Department, wrote the court to 
declare “this Government's opposition to forcible acts of dispossession of a discriminatory and 
confiscatory nature practiced by the Germans on the countries or peoples subject to their 
controls.”64  The letter continued: “… it is this Government's policy to undo the forced transfers 
and restitute identifiable property to the victims of Nazi persecution wrongfully deprived of such 
property; and [the Executive] sets forth that [its] policy … is to relieve American courts from any 
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restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi 
officials”65 [emphasis mine]. 
On the strength of Tate’s clear statement, the Second Circuit found that “this supervening 
expression of Executive Policy” allowed for a case-by-case exception to the Act of State 
Doctrine.  Bernstein’s suit could proceed.66  So began the “Bernstein Letter exception.”  Federal 
courts would thereafter find an exception to the doctrine upon the Executive’s submission of 
letters of interest, which became generically known as “Bernstein Letters.”67  They are now 
canonized in most international law textbooks.68 
More important for the argument here, Bernstein’s cases foreshadowed litigation fifty 
years later.  In general, even strong restitution suits such as Bernstein’s could not overcome 
dismissal.  His first efforts to hold MNCs liable in wrongful enrichment failed, despite a strong 
case that clearly identified the wrong of duress and traced the misappropriation of identifiable 
assets to the defendant.  Bernstein alleged specific, readily calculable gains that the defendant 
enjoyed at his expense.  But the Dutch shipping companies could initially escape liability 
because the root cause of the wrongful enrichment lay in the sovereign acts of a criminal state 
(an all too common phenomenon in gross human rights violations).  However, once Bernstein 
secured support from the political branches, he could by-pass the affirmative defense available in 
the Act of State Doctrine.  The barriers to wrongful enrichment suits arising from human rights 
violations are too strong for them to prevail in the courts alone without support of the political 
branches.  “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy”, at least in this case, was less about private parties initiating 
lawsuits to influence traditional diplomacy as it was about securing the support of the State to 
influence the courts. 
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(b) Kelberine, the First Holocaust-era Class Action 
Defendant MNCs easily stifled private litigation that lacked political support.  Kelberine 
v. Societe Internationale, 363 F. 2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1966) provides an example.  It also illustrates 
an attempt to recover in quantum meruit for lost wages in slave labor, another common strategy 
in Holocaust-era suits.   
Kelberine again involved an MNC of a non-belligerent nation.  A Swiss corporation, 
Societe Internationale (Interhandel), had recently recovered $120 million from the auction of a 
German corporation in an unrelated lawsuit against the United States Alien Property Custodian 
(which held the assets of enemy aliens in trusteeship during the war).69  The Kelberine plaintiffs 
alleged that Interhandel was a successor corporation to I.G. Farbenindustrie, a German chemical 
cartel, whose leading executives had been convicted at Nuremberg for war crimes.  Plaintiffs 
claimed to represent themselves and all similarly situated survivors whom I.G. Farben had forced 
to endure slave labor.  They claimed the $120 million owed to Interhandel in compensation.70  
Unlike Bernstein’s cases, however, Kelberine advanced no credible claims to identifiable assets.  
No plaintiff argued that the liquidated German corporation or any other Interhandel assets had 
ever belonged to her.  Rather, the plaintiffs targeted Interhandel’s alleged wrongful enrichment 
as “a creature of I.G. Farben,” which had been “an integral part of the Nazi conspiracy, 
participat[ing] in it, and profit[ing] from it …”71  They also claimed unpaid wages in quantum 
meruit.   
The courts exercise great discretion in deciding the measure of remedy in restitutionary 
suits, but this has upper limits.  Both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution limit recovery to the measurable benefit conferred or the value of services, 
whichever is more.72  If a quantum meruit case is without fault, the defendant is only liable for 
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the calculable benefit services conveyed or their market worth, whichever is less. 73  If the 
Kelberine plaintiffs had prevailed in quantum meruit, their remedy would have been the market 
value of their labor (plus interest on that sum during the intervening years).  If they had prevailed 
in their wrongful enrichment claim arising out of the crime of slavery, they could have laid claim 
to the measurable profits from that crime. 
The burden of proof, however, rests with the plaintiff.  The Kelberine survivors would 
have had to trace the ill-gotten gains of their services with I.G. Farben to Internhandel’s 
ownership of a third corporation.  Interhandel would not have been liable for all of I.G. Farben’s 
alleged profits from slave labor, but only those traceable to its subsidiary.  Internhandel would 
have doubtlessly appealed to the Act of State Doctrine, arguing that it relied upon the legality, 
under international law, of a sovereign nation’s right to structure its own labor laws.  In addition, 
Interhandel could have claimed the defense of “remoteness.”  Typically "downstream corporate 
benefits," such as the profits earned from combining labor with myriad other industrial inputs, 
are "too attenuated and too speculative" to qualify for a wrongful enrichment claim because these 
factor inputs are too remote from the eventual final profit.74  “There comes a point beyond which 
an infringer's profits, from its enterprises as a whole, cannot legally be attributed to a particular 
act of infringement."75  The doctrine of remoteness conforms to the general theory of restitution, 
which holds that plaintiffs have a right only to profits readily traceable to their infringed rights.76 
But, as with the Bernstein cases, the Kelberine court never reached the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ claims and instead found the whole issue of Holocaust-era restitution non-justiciable.77  
The D.C. Circuit affirmed in a seven-page opinion: 
[T]he [plaintiffs’] problem is not within the established scope of judicial 
authority. … adjudication of some two hundred thousand claims for multifarious 
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damages inflicted twenty to thirty years ago in a European area by a government 
then in power … is too complicated, too costly, to justify undertaking by a court 
without legislative provision of the means wherewith to proceed. … The events, 
the witnesses, the guilty tortfeasors, their membership in the conspiracy are all so 
potentially vague at this point as to pose an insoluble problem if undertaken by 
the courts without legislative or executive guidance, authorization or support. The 
whole concept is too uncertain of legal validity to sustain the self-establishment of 
the proceedings by a court in the absence of specific legislative or executive 
formulation. It seems to us that the trial court correctly dismissed the action for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.78 
Although Baker v. Carr had been decided four years earlier, the court did not invoke its now-
canonized “political questions doctrine.”79  Nevertheless, Kelberine court’s reasoning relied upon 
several Baker factors.  The court declared the entire matter was one for the political branches; 
that its adjudication promised no consistent legal standards upon which the court might decide; 
and that the Constitution did not commit the issue to the courts.80  The early Kelberine class 
action, like almost all Holocaust-era litigation, foundered at the pleadings stage in the absence of 
what the court called “legislative or executive guidance.”81   
(c) Hugo Princz’s Case 
A suit brought by the survivor Hugo Princz against the Federal Republic of Germany 
demonstrated that this overarching pattern had not changed by the mid-1990s.  Since the first 
cases of the 1940s, the U.S. courts had undergone a sea-change in the adjudication of 
international human-rights law.  Many U.S. courts had come to see international law as not 
merely governing the relations among states parties, but as extending human rights to 
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individuals, even against their own governments. 82  Some judges recognized these rights as 
granting a private cause of action to litigants against multinational corporations.83 
Princz resided with his family in Slovakia at the time of the Holocaust but enjoyed 
American citizenship.  Slovakia deported him to Nazi Germany nonetheless, where he endured 
slave labor in the concentration camps working for I.G. Farben and the airplane manufacturer 
Messerschmitt.  He was the sole survivor among his immediate family, and he continued to 
endure misfortune after the war.  Although the German government set up reparations programs 
for numerous groups, including the remnant of German Jewry, Czechoslovakian Jews, and Israel, 
Princz was repeatedly declared ineligible due to his American citizenship.  In 1992, he sought to 
recover through the courts what state diplomacy had denied him, suing for false imprisonment, 
assault and battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  He also sought “the 
value of his labor in the IG Farben and Messershmidt [sic.] plants" in quantum meruit.84 
Princz survived a first motion to dismiss in the District Court of the District of 
Columbia,85 where the Federal Republic of Germany claimed sovereign immunity.86  Judge 
Stanley Sporkin found that the current German state was the successor to “a merciless 
government in flagrant disregard of international law, the laws of civilized societies and all 
principles of human decency…”87  Sovereigns that commit gross violations of human rights, 
Sporkin ruled, had no entitlement to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) and could be held liable for violating individuals’ rights. 
In a 2-1 split decision, the D.C. Circuit reversed.  Exploring FSIA’s various exceptions, 
Judge Ginsburg held that slave labor was not sufficiently like commercial activity to qualify for 
the FSIA’s commercial exception.88  FSIA also specifies that foreign sovereigns are subject to 
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suit for “property taken in violation of international law,”89 but the court held that violations of 
human rights did not convey subject matter jurisdiction under this exception either: 
We think that something more nearly express is wanted before we impute to the 
Congress an intention that the federal courts assume jurisdiction over the 
countless human rights cases that might well be brought by the victims of all the 
ruthless military juntas, presidents-for-life, and murderous dictators of the world, 
from Idi Amin to Mao Zedong.90 
Finally, even if the sovereign government of Germany was not immune under the FSIA, 
Ginsburg wrote, Princz’s tort and quantum meruit claims fell under state law and did not raise 
federal questions sufficient to confer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.91 
Although Princz’s litigation faltered, transnational process could succeed with the aid of 
the political branches.  The U.S. House and Senate reacted by passing resolutions urging the 
Executive to “take all appropriate steps necessary to ensure that this matter will be expeditiously 
resolved and that fair reparations will be provided Mr. Princz.”92  Both houses introduced 
legislation to strip Germany of sovereign immunity so that suits like Princz’s could proceed.93  
Germany responded with traditional diplomacy.  It sought to quiet Princz’s claims through an 
Executive Agreement with President Clinton,94 establishing a $2.1 million fund to be distributed 
to Princz and ten other Holocaust survivors, all of whom had been American citizens during the 
Holocaust.95   
The Princz case, with its mix of litigation and intervention by the political branches 
recapitulated the pattern long set by the Bernstein cases.  Although Judge Sporkin’s first ruling 
appealed to deeper changes in American law that recognized individual causes of action in 
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international human claims, Princz failed upon appeal.  He and those similarly situated could 
succeed only after concerted action by the political branches led to a negotiated settlement. 
Section II: Less than Slaves and Less than Profits 
Bernstein, Kelberine and Princz introduced the three kinds of restitution claims raised in 
all subsequent Holocaust-era litigation: restitution of identifiable assets, quantum meruit, and 
wrongful enrichment.  The last two are easily confused because the crime of slavery may give 
rise to both, but they are distinct.  Plaintiffs claimed a right to back wages in quantum meruit.  
Their claim to MNCs’ profits from that labor arose in wrongful enrichment.  If the Holocaust-era 
lawsuits are to serve as a model for future international human rights litigation, these 
restitutionary theories deserve far more analysis than they have so far received.  Because 
eventual settlements amounted to billions of dollars, it is often assumed that the merits of the 
claims were strong.96  Yet this assumption rests on a two-fold mistake.  First, litigation was not 
the key to success; rather transnational processes that were primarily political made the 
settlements possible.  Second, claims to the profits of MNCs had little basis in historical fact, and 
even the quantum meruit claims were vulnerable to strong defenses. 
The survivors’ plight evinced all the ingredients of a straightforward tort: duty, breach of 
duty, and harm.  The common law holds that employers owe an affirmative duty to exercise 
reasonable care to avert danger or harm to employees within the scope of employment.97  
Although the Holocaust did not originate in corporate board rooms, Germany’s leading 
companies undeniably participated.  As complicit, often eager parties alongside the Nazi regime, 
MNCs committed acts that intentionally and proximately caused the plaintiffs harm.  Those 
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MNCs that had benefited financially from those wrongs should have been liable to disgorge their 
ill-gotten gains, whether these arose from slave labor or other intentional torts.   
Sensationally, plaintiffs linked these theories to speculation about “enormous profits” and 
the wealth of West Germany’s post-war capitalist economy.  Yet there is little evidence that the 
crimes of the Holocaust generated vast wealth.  Although it is still popular among some 
historians to allege that “German corporations … consumed with greed” fueled the National 
Socialist regime, no credible economic historian would support this claim.98  The Nazi regime 
undertook its slave labor program in a desperate attempt to prop up war production after 
exhausting all other reservoirs of labor.  For precisely this reason, it was also relatively short 
lived.  The vast majority of companies that employed slave laborers did so only in the last years 
of war, from mid-1942 and 1945.  The murderous peak of the Holocaust occurred between early 
1942 and mid-1943.  But German companies generally enjoyed the highest profit rates during the 
first two years of war (1939-40 & 1940-41) before either the slave-labor program or the killing 
campaigns.99 
This section investigates the historical basis for Holocaust slave-labor restitution claims, 
both in quantum meruit and wrongful enrichment.  It does so by assuming (as U.S. courts have 
not) that these were not barred at the outset due to political questions, statutes of limitations, 
post-war treaties, or various sovereign immunity doctrines.  Plaintiffs had a plausibly case to 
recover the value of their labor in quantum meruit, dealt with in subsection (a) below.  However, 
the likely recovery would have been uneven and subject to various defenses and offsets.  Section 
(b) turns to the survivors’ more sensational wrongful enrichment claim, which fares more poorly 
in the light of history.  In 1979, Benjamin Ferencz argued that the victims of Nazi Germany had 
been “less than slaves.”100  His larger point was that Nazi Germany behaved even more 
21 
 
irrationally than traditional slave holders, who preserved their chattels—if not for their 
humanity—then at least for their property value.  By contrast, the Nazis wantonly destroyed 
human life, even when this made no economic sense.101  What was true for the Nazi period is 
applicable to contemporary human rights litigation against MNCs discussed in section IV: 
because gross human rights violations are not noted for “enormous” profitability, wrongful 
enrichment is unlikely to provide viable theories of recovery in ongoing efforts to hold MNCs 
accountable. 
(a) Quantum Meruit 
Victims of slave labor had the strongest cause of action in quantum meruit for lost wages.  
The existence of profits was irrelevant to this claim.  Employers are liable for wages, whether 
loosing or making money.  But the sums in 1945 were not “enormous.”  A man’s average 
industrial wage in Germany was 51 RM a week (about $200); in low paying sectors like 
construction it was 38 RM ($152); and for women it was around 22 RM ($88).  Since slave labor 
in the German war economy usually-lasted no more than the three year period from mid-1942 to 
May, 1945, 150 weeks is s reasonable estimate for quantum meruit.  This yields labor value of 
7,650 RM for skilled men, 5,700 RM for unskilled men, and 3,300 RM for women.  Because the 
RM was worth roughly four times the dollar, these were meaningful sums, between three and 
four times more than the German Foundation’s typical payouts of between 15,000 DM and 5,000 
DM (roughly $10,000 and $3,333 at the relatively high exchange rate of 1.5 DM per U.S. 
dollar).102 
Survivors may have also been entitled to reasonable interest on back wages that German 
employers had wrongfully retained over the intervening 50 years.  A recovery of value plus 
interest would have led to far larger recoveries, even if one assumes an interest rate of only 4%, 
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approximate to average inflation between 1945 and 1999.  By contrast, the Swiss Bank 
settlement employed a figure in this ballpark, roughly equal to an APR of 4.2%.103  An industrial 
laborer should have been able to recover over $250,000 and an unskilled female worker almost 
$110,000.104 
   Skilled Men, Industry  Unskilled Men  Women, Industry 
 Weekly Wage   51 RM 38 RM 22 RM 
 Max. for 150 Weeks  7,650 RM 5,700 RM 3,300 RM 
 Total in Dollars   $30,600  $22,800  $13,200 
 At 4% in 1999   $254,403 $189,555 $ 109,742 
Table of lost wages based on Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hackenkreuz 
(2001), 152, 185-6 
These calculations indicate that the roughly $8 to $9 billion in total settlements for all Holocaust-
era litigants in the late 1990s was low and would not have sufficed to restitute more than 36,000 
skilled male workers in quantum meruit.   
Yet 88% of this hypothetical recovery is due to the time-value of money and assumes that 
claimants could have recovered over fifty-years’ worth of interest.  Quantum meruit is based 
upon an award of damages for lost wages on an implied contract, but prejudgment interest, the 
interest that accrues from the time a cause of action arises, is a purely restitutionary claim.  It is 
meant to restore a benefit unjustly retained by the defendant rather than harm suffered by the 
plaintiff.  American courts award prejudgment interest as a default, especially in cases involving 
back pay,105 but they also have broad discretion to deny it or adjust the interest rate.106 
The paradigmatic case that establishes judicial discretion over this issue, Board of County 
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939), denies prejudgment interest.  A Kansas county 
had illegally assessed two decades’ worth of taxes on Indian lands in violation of federal treaty.  
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The Supreme Court reversed an interest award on the restituted tax proceeds, stating that 
“interest is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is 
given in response to considerations of fairness. It is denied when its exaction would be 
inequitable.”107    Although the Court expressed sympathy for the Indians’ cause, the Court held 
that disgorgement would place an inequitable burden on the Kansas county in question.108 
Board of County Comm’rs still serves as good law supporting the courts’ broad authority 
to award or withhold interest.  Such decisions are reviewable only for abuse of discretion.109  The 
Fifth Circuit includes “peculiar circumstances” among the reasons for denying interest,110 and 
courts will deny prejudgment interest from a bankrupt company which has suffered a change of 
position.111  Furthermore, like restitution remedies generally, interest awards are not punitive; 
they merely return a wrongful or unjust enrichment.112  With such wide latitude and such 
imprecise standards, it is by no means certain that Holocaust survivors could have recovered 
billions in interest for harms suffered half a century earlier for historical injustices addressed by 
several waves of reparations agreements and treaties between the states parties to World War 
II.113 
German MNCs would also have argued that survivors who had recovered via various 
German reparations programs, totaling roughly 100 billion in contemporary dollars, should not 
be allowed a “double recovery.”114  Defendants in quantum meruit are also allowed a defense if 
the services rendered benefited the plaintiff.  Unsurprisingly, the highest-value labor in the 
German slave labor program tended to be the safest.  For example, prisoners engaged in the 
assembly lines of the V-2 rockets, a high-priority project in the late-war period, received extra 
rations and suffered relatively low attrition rates.  Meanwhile, their fellow prisoners assigned to 
low-skill construction work died by the tens of thousands.115  Industrialists had strong incentives 
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to shield scarce and productive workers from the brutality of the regime.  Protection was always 
qualified and tied to productivity, but it was nevertheless real.  Historians have long known that 
the victims’ chances of survival increased to the extent that they could secure industrial 
employment.116  Defendant MNCs would have argued, grotesquely, that they “benefited” 
plaintiffs by “helping” them survive, and some historical evidence supports this, despite the fact 
that MNCs behaved atrociously as willingly participants in Hitler’s genocidal regime. 
Because quantum meruit is not a punitive remedy, it does not necessarily facilitate 
recovery for evil wrongs.117  The deadliest labor, low-skilled construction work or quarry work, 
for example, was also the least valuable.  Quantum meruit would have inevitably led to smaller 
recoveries in such cases, just as it would provide little remedy for the squalid, menial labor 
alleged in contemporary slave labor suits against oil companies in Sudan or Myanmar where 
wages can be less than one dollar a day.118  Plaintiffs who had suffered most would have 
received the least.  Moreover, plaintiffs would have had to carry the burden of establishing which 
employers they worked for, assuming they still existed, and what fair-market wages had been.  
Only then would the burden shift to MNCs to sustain defenses or refute factual allegations.119 
(b) Wrongful Enrichment 
The heart of the Holocaust-era litigation was the wrongful enrichment claim to ill-gotten 
profits of MNCs, but historical research has demonstrated that MNCs’ ill-gotten gains were 
modest at best and sometimes non-existent.  When threatened with lawsuits, many German 
corporations hired professional historians, granted them free access to their archives, and 
requested accurate histories in order to assess their liability.120  Plaintiffs’ lawyers and their 
advocates among legal scholars tended to rely upon whatever dubious historical research 
supported their cause.121  Some, like Michael Hausfeld, endeavored to base pleadings on archival 
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research but never tempered their claims when this produced little evidence of engorged 
profits.122  Others, like Neuborne, simply repeated, sometimes before Congress, the most 
exaggerated statements drawn from the pleadings regardless of their foundation in historical 
fact.123 
It is easy to understand why Holocaust survivors believed that their labor had enriched 
corporations.  They received nothing, or at best next to nothing, while working longer hours than 
German civilians.124  It appears self-evident that slave labor must have led to large profits, 
especially if, as it seemed, corporations did not pay for it.  But this common-sense impression 
actually rests upon a misunderstanding that survivors, who lived in squalid work camps, could 
not know.  German industry did pay for slave labor; it merely had to pay the Third Reich.  
Documents to this effect were published as early as 1946 by the survivor of Buchenwald and 
historian Eugon Kogon, listing daily labor rents to industry of 6-8 Reichmark, though rates 
during the height of the slave-labor program could be as low as 4 Reichsmark per day and rarely 
greater than 6.125 
The common-sense belief that slave labor was “enormously” lucrative also fails to 
account for the complexity of modern industry in general and Germany’s workforce in particular.  
At the outset of World War II, Germany relied, as it does today, on a skilled workforce engaged 
in capital-intensive production.  Despite some sectors such as construction or, to some extent, 
women’s labor in the textiles,126 German industry was ill-adapted to unskilled labor.  Profits 
came from a relatively high-wage workforce, which businesses valued for its continuity, 
dedication, and flexibility at the worksite.127  Total war put an unbearable strain on this resource, 
not least because the German armed forces continued to call up laboring men, whom the Red 
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Army killed in great numbers on the Eastern Front.128  By the end of 1941, there were simply not 
enough German workers to keep the Nazi war machine running.   
By early 1942, Hitler empowered special officials to dragoon workers in Eastern Europe 
into German factories.  The vast concentration camp system, whose victims suffered the worst 
atrocities, also came under pressure to deploy prisoners in war-related industries.  By August of 
1944, compulsory labor made up just over 26% of the total workforce, although in sectors like 
construction, airframe manufacture, and mining it was much higher.129  German corporations had 
to change over from a skilled and highly-motivated workforce to one in which many workers 
came from agricultural regions of Eastern Europe and had never been inside a modern factory.  
These workers’ motivation to contribute to Germany’s war effort was understandably dismal.  
Slave labor also occasioned extra expenses, like one-time construction costs for work camps that 
bore no connection to normal industrial enterprise.130  MNCs also had to invest repeatedly in 
training workers, but lost this investment when workers fell ill or died under brutal conditions.  
From the perspective of a modern factory manager, the worst problem was productivity 
cost.  When the German economy converted to slave labor in the winter of 1941/1942, 
productivity among forced laborers fell 40 percent below that of German civilians.131  Industry 
adjusted quickly.  Historians Lutz Budraβ and Manfred Grieger have found that productivity 
rates for women forced to work in German aircraft production achieved levels comparable to 
skilled German workers by the end of the war.132  Given that employers had to pay female 
“Eastern Workers” less than half the wages of German men, it is hard to imagine that this did not 
benefit firms capable of achieving high productivity rates.133   
Yet many firms did not make the transition.  Historian Mark Spoerer has undertaken the 
most thorough synthesis of German productivity studies during World War II.  Predictably, these 
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varied widely and also varied by gender and national group.  Unsurprisingly, workers subjected 
to the worst treatment performed the worst, mirroring the racial hierarchies of Nazi ideology.  
Polish men rarely achieved productivity rates above 80% that of German men, but performed 
better than concentration camp prisoners.  Semi-skilled concentration camp prisoners were 
frequently only 40% as productive, and sometimes, as low as 16%.134  Thus, while it is true that 
some private corporations could reap profits from forced labor, poor performance often 
destroyed those gains in many firms.  Moreover, those laborers who experienced the worst 
treatment—concentration camp prisoners or Soviet prisoners of war—profited their employers 
the least.  In terms of wrongful enrichment, this meant they deserved the least remedy. 
The reasons for low productivity were obvious to contemporary German corporations.  A 
manager of the Mitteldeutsche Motorenwerke recorded, “In the manufacturing processes of an 
armaments plant it is simply not possible to exchange a man, who has been operating a special 
piece of machinery, with another worker.”135  An economic officer of the German armed forces 
summarized the dilemma with the brutal calculation so typical of the Third Reich:  
It is illusory to believe that one can achieve the same performance from 200 
inadequately fed people as with 100 properly fed workers ... the 100 well-fed 
workers produce far more and their employment is far more rational.  By contrast, 
the minimum rations distributed simply to keep people alive, since they are not 
matched by any equivalent performance, must be regarded from the point of view 
of the national war economy as a pure loss, which is further increased by the 
transport costs and administration [in rounding them up].136 
In many cases, forced laborers were simply too malnourished to perform.  Complaints echoed 
throughout the war economy, though rarely on behalf of the suffering victims.  An accountant 
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with Krupp Steel was hardly an exception when he complained, “Regarding how high the costs 
of foreign workers are when considering their productivity … the German workers are now as 
ever before the cheapest labor power.”137  
This Krupp manager was also complaining because German corporations never got 
forced labor for free.  Nazi Germany charged employers roughly 76% the wages of a German 
laboring man for Eastern workers (i.e. from Eastern Europe).  From these “wages,” the German 
Financial Office deducted hefty taxes, as did social welfare offices, subsidizing civilian benefits 
at the expense of foreign workers.  A German industrial worker could expect to receive an 
average of 51 Reichsmark (RM) per week, of which the state deducted about 12 RM for social 
services and taxes.  By comparison, employers paid an average of 39 RM for Eastern Workers, 
from which 10.50 RM went to room and board (whether or not actual room and board were 
adequate), and 23.60 RM flowed directly to state coffers.  "The maximum possible pay out [to 
the forced laborer] amounted to barely more than 6.5 RM … the Eastern Workers were mere 
slaves.”138  Concentration camp prisoners occupied the lowest rung in the slave labor hierarchy, 
but their fees were only marginally less.  The SS labor lords of the concentration camps charged 
German industry fees ranging from 18 RM per week for unskilled to 36 RM per week for skilled 
labor. 
The chart below synthesizes some of Spoerer’s findings regarding productivity costs, 
with each vertical bar representing the money a German firm had to pay to get the same 
production from each group of laborers.  Estimates of productivity varied widely in any given 
sector and even within individual plants.  The dark bars represent the low range of productivity 
for each class of workers; light, the highest range.  The cluster to the left compares estimates for 
industrial workers, in this case from a relatively high-wage Ruhr coal and steel operation.  
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Although an average man’s wage was 51 RM per week (roughly $200), these Ruhr workers 
made up to 63 RM per week.  Thus, the graph is purposely biased to make slave labor seem more 
profitable by comparing it to German wage earners who earned nearly 24% above the norm.  A 
second cluster of bar graphs to the right compares costs for construction work, a low-skill sector 
in which the Third Reich deployed a disproportionate number of the most brutalized workers.  
Below the line in each cluster was more profitable than German civilian labor; above the line 
was less profitable. 
The most productive Eastern workers offered some advantages in the industrial sector, 
especially those (like the women documented by Lutz Budraβ in airplane manufacturing) whose 
productivity rates approached German labor.  Their productivity costs could be as low as two 
thirds that of civilian men (ca: 68.6%).  For every other group, however, the gains remained 
modest at best, and slave labor often cost firms more than German civilian labor.139 Moreover, 
the majority of workers who achieved high productivity rates for slave labor were women.  
Defendant MNCs would have almost certainly argued that German women’s wages provided the 
appropriate fair-market value not male wages.  Contrary to the impression given by the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, German women were also highly mobilized in the German workforce,140 but 
the highest paid female industrial workers (in the electrical industries) earned about 63% less 




The cost of productivity, from statistics in Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit, 153, 185-6.  Dividing weekly wages 
by productivity yields productivity costs: what a German firm would have to pay each group of 
workers to produce the same volume of work.   
Any defendant opposing a wrongful enrichment claim would also have the usual defense 
of remoteness and proportional accounting.  Labor represented only one input in any 
sophisticated industrial operation, and investment in capital equipment could dwarf labor costs.  
Unlike the suit brought by Arnold Bernstein, in which a straightforward calculation could 
demonstrate the gains realized by the use of his ships, the tie between labor factors and profit is 
much more difficult.  In consequence, it would be much harder to recover in wrongful 
enrichment. 
And what of plaintiffs whose suffering and slavery actually conferred no real benefit?  
The SS, the Nazi organization that ran the concentration camps, utilized prisoners in an industrial 
empire of its own.  By the end of the war, however, these industries were bankrupt, and even 
their managers recognized the shaky fiscal foundations of slave labor: 
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The [Jewish] Ghetto industries are uneconomical, the average productivity per 
work day and labor power are minimal, and the profits are only a mirage.  The 
only reason for the further operation of Ghetto industries through the SS … lies in 
the increasing necessities of our war economy.  With all respect to the personal 
abilities and dedication of those who have been charged with the management of 
these factories … the Ghetto industries mean a substantial financial risk.142 
Not only was SS slave labor wasteful, its brutality usually far surpassed any other employer.143  
What could “wrongful enrichment” offer those who suffered in such enterprises?   
Or what of the labor of genocide itself, in which the concentration camps compelled 
Jewish men to toil at the annihilation of their own people?144  The main economic effect was the 
destruction of productive capacity—namely workers—not outrageous profits.  The Nazis robbed 
the murdered victims of their last possessions, even dental gold, but the highest estimates of this 
wealth comes to 23 million RM, which did not match the total capitalization of some individual 
subsidiaries of the SS’s own companies (themselves paltry compared to industrial giants like 
Siemens, I.G. Farben, or Krupp)145  What can human rights litigation gain from pursuing 
remedies that differentiate among victims in ways that only magnify already horrible injustices?  
By contrast the German Foundation strove to encompass all victims of the Nazi’s slave-labor 
program and compensated those who had suffered the most with larger payments.146 
Neither existing scholarship nor the caselaw of Holocaust-era restitution yields any 
evidence that Plaintiffs’ lawyers or their advocates among scholars ever undertook these kinds of 
calculations.  For the most part they predicated their theories of recovery on little more than 
sensational assertions.147  In response to professional historians’ research demonstrating that 
Nazi-era profits were modest, if they existed at all, plaintiffs’ advocates merely resorted to 
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impugning the “objectivity” of historians.148  It is easy to share the indignation of Bazyler and 
others that the criminality of modern corporations in the Holocaust “was an injustice that cannot 
be ignored";149 but this is a poor substitute for the historical evidence that survivors would have 
needed to carry their burden of proof at trial. 
Section III: Continuity in Holocaust-era restitution suits 
In the late 1990s, Holocaust-era litigation came to involve hundreds of thousands of 
plaintiffs, divided roughly into two clusters.  The first involved the Swiss commercial banks 
discussed in section (a).  By the mid-1990s, the banks’ had entered into negotiations over the 
sequestered accounts of Holocaust survivors with NGOs and the United States.  Impatient of the 
outcome, several classes of plaintiffs sued in wrongful enrichment, claiming a right not only to 
sequestered accounts but also to ill-gotten gains allegedly earned in transactions with Nazi-era 
MNCs.  Subsequently, in a second cluster of lawsuits discussed in section (b), plaintiffs sued 
Nazi-era MNCs directly for their participation in slave labor, seeking recovery in quantum 
meruit and wrongful enrichment.  The eventual settlements totaled seven to nine billion dollars, 
depending upon whose estimate one uses.150  These eye-popping sums and the publicity they 
generated have contributed to a heroic image of plaintiffs slaying the Goliath of MNCs in 
international human rights litigation.  It is a compelling story and contains a kernel of truth. 
While European courtrooms were “fortresses of the powerful,”151 argued Neuborne, the 
United States offered "a virtually unique legal system that provides a genuinely level playing 
field for a poor Holocaust survivor seeking to confront a corporate giant."152  Professor Michael 
Bazyler has been even more enthusiastic: “The real hero of this story is the American justice 
system.” 153  He singles out the ability of plaintiffs to initiate suits, the federal class action (FRCP 
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23), contingency fees, the jury trial for civil litigation, and “an independent judiciary that does 
not ‘take marching orders’ from the political branches of government.”154  This fosters the 
impression that heroic class action lawyers took on plutocratic corporations in federal court in 
defiance of U.S. government “marching orders” or, at the very least, callous indifference.  Given 
the undeniable suffering of Holocaust survivors, it is difficult not to applaud. 
On closer inspection, however, the litigation of the late 1990s deviated little from the 
pattern long set by the Bernstein cases.  As a rule, restitution suits failed at the pleadings, unless 
the political branches stepped in to give strong guidance.   Lawsuits to recover identifiable assets 
or tangible property sometimes succeeded, most prominently in Austria v. Altmann.155  There, 
Maria Altmann’s sued to recover paintings by Gustav Klimt stolen from her family during the 
Third Reich, which Austrian museums still held after the war.  The Supreme Court upheld the 
California district court’s holding that her suit could proceed and Austria thereafter entered into 
arbitration.156  Suits fared far worse when plaintiffs brought weak quantum meruit or wrongful 
enrichment claims predicated on speculation about “enormous” profits earned by MNCs.157 
It is also a misperception that litigants prompted the government to act.  As discussed 
below, talks between the Swiss banks, NGOs, and the political branches of the U.S. government 
preceded the class actions by nearly three years.158  The vast majority of cases settled, not in the 
courtroom, but in heated negotiations championed by diplomats and powerful U.S. politicians, 
among whom disdain for the class action lawyers was not uncommon.159  Congress, especially 
Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York and other politicians, such as New York’s Comptroller 
Alan Hevesi, likely did more for the eventual settlements than the class actions.  In any event, the 
litigation fit into a fluid stream of transnational interactions.  Overemphasis on litigation easily 
obscures what, exactly, the lawsuits accomplished.   
34 
 
As discussed in section (c), the settlement of the German lawsuits actually strengthened 
the influence of the Executive over the Holocaust-era litigation.  This is ironic.  The heroic 
narrative of Holocaust-era restitution offered by scholars such as Bazyler celebrates litigation as 
a model for future human rights activism.  But the settlements and the subsequent quieting of the 
lawsuits has dampened the prospects for what Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco have 
called “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy,” the effort of private litigants to take their activism in foreign 
policy to the courthouse, bypassing the political representatives of States.160  The Holocaust-era 
suits increased judicial deference to the political branches, especially the Executive.  
(a) The Swiss Bank Settlement 
A class represented by Edward Fagan filed the first lawsuit against the Swiss banks on 
October 3rd, 1996 in the Eastern District of New York.161  Just as Bernstein’s cases had targeted 
the MNCs of third party States (Belgium and the Netherlands) rather than Germany or its 
national corporations, Fagan first targeted Swiss companies: the Union Bank of Switzerland 
(UBS) and the Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC).  A second class action filed by Michael Hausfeld 
also included Credit Suisse.162 
The litigation increased political pressure on the Swiss banks after a series of scandals in 
the early 1990s revealed how much Nazi Germany had relied upon Switzerland.  Although 
Switzerland remained neutral during World War II, its economy was inextricably bound to the 
Axis powers, and its connections to the Holocaust reached far deeper than business transactions.  
For instance, the Germans had introduced the infamous “J” in every Jewish passport starting in 
1938 in cooperation with the Swiss to control Jewish flight into Switzerland.163   
Such scandals led first to inquiries by NGOs into identifiable assets held by Swiss banks 
in accounts rightfully belonging to Holocaust survivors and their heirs.164  After the war, 
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survivors tried to recover these assets, but the banks consistently stonewalled.  A favorite 
technique was to require a “death certificate” as proof that an account holder was truly deceased 
before releasing the accounts to an estate.  Since camps like Auschwitz hardly provided their 
victims with “death certificates” during the extermination of the Jews, survivors found 
themselves in a cynical bureaucratic trap.165 
No one played a larger role in piercing this bureaucratic recalcitrance than Edgar 
Bronfman, heir to the Seagram fortune and President of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) since 
1982.  Bronfman also headed the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) within the 
WJC.  He and his top aid, Israel Singer, first sought meetings with the Swiss Bankers 
Association in 1993.  Their aims were modest: the WJRO wanted the banks to reveal survivors’ 
dormant accounts and return sequestered assets to their rightful owners. 
What should have been straightforward quickly generated an international controversy.  
First, Bronfman felt personally rebuffed.  The President of the Swiss Bankers Association 
arrived late to their first meeting after making Bronfman wait for an excessively long time (at 
least by his standards, namely ten minutes.)  Moreover, Bronfman had to wait alone in a 
reception room, only increasing his irritation.  When the banking official did finally arrive, he 
treated Bronfman to a perfunctory speech about a meager 774 dormant accounts and assured him 
that all possible measures were being taken to rectify the situation.  Bronfman had good cause 
for anger at this.  Independent audits later revealed almost four times the number of sequestered 
accounts, not to mention systematic attempts to destroy evidence of their existence and outright 
fraud.166  Bronfman quickly explored alternative routes to achieve restitution but he did not 
threaten a lawsuit.  Instead, he contacted Senator D’Amato, then chair of the Senate Banking 
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Committee.  Eventually Bronfman also involved Hillary Clinton, and through her the 
President.167 
Thus the snub of Bronfman generated greater political pressure.  Senator D’Amato held 
hearings on the Holocaust-era accounts on 23 April 1996, during which Bronfman raised new, 
headline-grabbing claims.  He produced a document from the U.S. National Archives 
demonstrating that the death camps had shipped stolen gold, including the fillings from their 
victims’ teeth, through the Swiss National Bank (SNB).  It did not matter that the commercial 
banks had played a minor role in processing looted gold and were distinct from the SNB.  As 
Switzerland’s central bank, the SNB was an agent of the Swiss state, enjoyed broad immunity 
under the FSIA, and was never sued.168  Nevertheless, very quickly all the big Swiss commercial 
banks stood accused of being “Hitler’s Bankers” and “Fences for the Führer.”169  The WJRO 
demanded compensation for looted assets, notwithstanding that almost all of these had been 
handled by the Swiss National Bank.  This new claim vastly extended the pool of potential 
plaintiffs.  Jews with sufficient means and sophistication to hold Swiss bank accounts numbered 
in the low thousands.  Those plundered of their last meager possessions by the Nazis numbered 
in the millions.170 
The timing could not have been worse for the Swiss bankers.  UBS and SBC were then 
entering merger negotiations, and these had to pass muster under United States anti-trust 
regulation in order for the banks to operate in the global capital markets of Wall Street.  The 
banks had to secure the goodwill of Senator D’Amato’s Banking Committee, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.  Bad publicity also hurt 
them with institutional investors such as the large state pension funds.171  This provided 
Bronfman and the WJC with considerable leverage and set the stage for a transnational 
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settlement involving private corporations, NGOs, states like New York and California, and the 
federal political branches.172  Plaintiff’s lawyers, law suits, and slave labor restitution initially 
had nothing to do with these negotiations.  The early talks revolved around identifiable assets 
covered by legal claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or the tort of conversion. 
Stuart Eizenstat, then US ambassador to the European Union and Special Envoy on 
Property Restitution in Central and Eastern Europe for the Secretary of State and shortly to 
become Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State on Holocaust 
Issues,173 believed that the Swiss could have ended the entire matter in 1996.  Had the Swiss 
state decided to play a role—as the German government did in a later phase—the entire affair 
might have wrapped up in a way resembling traditional diplomacy or private arbitration.  The 
Banks and the WJC/WJRO came close to a quiet settlement agreement on 2 May 1996, shortly 
after D’Amato’s hearings.174  Despite testy nerves and several missed opportunities, the Swiss 
Bankers Association had agreed to an audit of accounts led by former Chairman of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Paul Volcker. 
Into these delicate and charged negotiations the American class action lawyers lobbed a 
new raft of sensational claims to recover wrongful enrichments from slave labor.  There was no 
doubt that German companies depended upon slave labor by the end of World War II.  Some few 
corporate executives had even been tried and convicted for this in the Nuremberg Trials.175  The 
class actions now demanded that Swiss banks disgorge any profits they had earned vicariously 
from this modern industrial slavery.  The questionable merits of these claims prompted Eizenstat 
to comment, “The lawyers hijacked the Swiss bank dispute.”176  The bankers suspended 
negotiations with Eizenstant and the NGOs.   
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The Swiss bank cases were consolidated in the Eastern District of New York under Judge 
Edward Korman.  Eventually, largely due to the efforts of Stuart Eizenstat and Judge Korman, 
the parties brokered a settlement for $1.25 billion.177  Under FRCP 23 (e), the federal courts may 
certify class actions for the purposes of settlement only.178  Judges may do so even in cases 
where doubt exists about whether a class could ever be certified for trial or where the merits are 
dubious.179  Parties must propose agreements to the court, and judges initially review them for 
fairness and instruct notice to be served on members of the class.180  If a settlement passes muster 
in a final fairness hearing after notice and an opportunity for class members to opt out, it is 
entered as binding upon class members.  Judge Korman made clear to the plaintiffs, however, 
that despite his approval of the $1.25 billion settlement, he found serious weaknesses in the 
plaintiffs’ cases.  “Deposited assets claims rested on a solid legal claim beyond unjust 
enrichment.  No one ever douted that they [the claimants] had a right to be repaid,” he later 
remarked, but “The plaintiffs threw everything but the kitchen sink [into the category or 
restitution].  They often never stated a cause of action at all.”181 
Korman’s non-descript statement in his opinion (“The alternative to this settlement was 
prolonged, complex and difficult litigation, in which plaintiffs' chance of success as a class was 
uncertain”182) fails to convey the doubts that he and Eizenstat repeatedly voiced about the 
wrongful enrichment claims.183  The plaintiffs’ lawyers and many legal scholars have 
consistently overlooked these objections.184  Stuart Eizenstat—very sympathetic to the survivors 
and independent of the Swiss banks—referred to the plaintiffs’ claims as based on 
“quicksand”185 and believed, “the evidentiary essence [that] could have lent legitimacy to the 
massive settlement was utterly lacking.”186   
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It is important to separate claims for identifiable assets from the slave labor/wrongful 
enrichment claims.  Independent audits yielded hard documentary evidence that backed up 
thousands of claims for dormant accounts.  Moreover, the Swiss banks’ egregious behavior in 
destroying records only created a further legal presumption of truth to the plaintiffs’ allegations 
regarding these accounts.187  But in restitution, plaintiffs still bore the burden of proving the two 
basic elements of a wrongful enrichment: 1) that the defendant had gained 2) at the plaintiff’s 
expense.  Only after the plaintiff met this burden would the burden have shifted to the defendant 
MNCs to sustain defenses or to attack the plaintiff’s facts.188  Michael Hausfeld, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer who made the most systematic use of historical research, merely alluded to a study by 
Helen Junz that documented the overall wealth of the Jews of Europe before the Holocaust.189  
He then argued that the remedy for wrongful enrichment should roughly equal this sum, entitling 
victims to upwards of $16 billion.190  Junz’s study is undeniably sound, but mere allegations that 
all Jewish assets must have, in some way, passed through Swiss commercial banks can hardly 
count as a sophisticated factual argument.  By contrast, the WJC—hardly a mouthpiece of Swiss 
MNCs—estimated that the private Swiss banks had handled no more than $20 million in German 
looted assets.191  Neither the Swiss banks nor their shareholders took the wrongful enrichment 
claims seriously as legal arguments, although they showed a healthy fear of bad publicity,192 and 
even Hausfeld admitted to Eizenstat that “he could not supply a connection that would stand up 
in court.”193   
(b) The German Foundation Settlement 
Parties to the Swiss Bank litigation reached an agreement in 1998, with the final fairness 
hearing concluded on 9 August 2000.194  Parallel to these negotiations, many of the same lawyers 
filed class actions against German MNCs based almost entirely upon restitution theories of slave 
40 
 
labor.  Elsa Iwanowa, representing a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, filed the first suit in 
New Jersey District Court against the Ford-Werke A.G, the German subsidiary of Ford Motor 
Company.195  Two more classes of plaintiffs brought suit against Degussa (Deutsche Gold- und 
Silber-Scheide Anstalt), the firm that had smelted dental gold and other precious metals 
plundered from the murdered Jews of Europe.  Degussa had also owned a share in firms that 
marketed Zylon B, the poison used in the gas chambers.  The New Jersey District Court 
consolidated the Degussa lawsuits with two more class actions against the electrical 
manufacturer Siemens as Burger-Fischer v. Degussa.  Siemens had operated a plant at 
Auschwitz and other concentration camps.196  Iwanowa and Degussa were the first to reach any 
judgment in the wave of Holocaust-era litigation of the late 1990s, if only on the pleadings. They 
became the most prominent of over fifty lawsuits against German corporations at around the 
same time.197 
Elsa Iwanowa, born in Rostov, Russia and living in Belgium, sued as an alien under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act.198  She alleged that the Ford-Werke A.G. had “purchased her” and 
transported her to work in Cologne, where she suffered torts of bodily and emotional harm in 
violation of customary international law.199  Iwanowa coupled her straightforward tort claims to 
wrongful enrichment and quantum meruit, alleging that Nazi Germany had “encouraged German 
industries to bid for forced laborers in order to … increase their profits.”200   She sought 
“disgorgement of all economic benefits which have accrued to Defendants as a result of her 
forced labor [and] compensation for the reasonable value of her services.”201   
The New Jersey District Court found that Iwanowa could sue Ford-Werke in any federal 
district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (d), and extended diversity jurisdiction over Ford Motor 
Works.202  However, Judge Joseph Greenaway noted a major weakness of restitution as a basis 
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for international human-rights suits: the ATCA conveys jurisdiction over aliens suing in tort 
only, but says nothing about wrongful enrichments incident to those torts.203  Moreover, aliens 
cannot sustain ATCA claims against an alien company in U.S. federal courts unless the 
defendant has minimum contacts to the United States.204  The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in being exempt from binding judgments in fora to 
which he has no meaningful contacts.205  This presented no impediment to litigation against Ford 
but would have barred countless other Holocaust-era suits.  Slave laborers would have had no 
remedy, for example, if they had worked for strictly German businesses such as the many 
construction companies that employed the bulk of concentration camp prisoners.206  By contrast, 
the eventual German Foundation settlement, achieved by states parties, sought to restitute as 
many potential claimants as possible regardless of the companies they worked for.207 
Iwanowa made sensational allegations about the defendants’ enrichment the heart of her 
case.  Her pleadings to this effect are frequently cited as if they were historical fact, without 
reference to well-established historical scholarship:  
… ‘the use of unpaid, forced laborers by Ford-Werke A.G. was immensely 
profitable’ to the extent that ‘Ford-Werke A.G.’s annual profits doubled by 1943.’  
Following the war, Ford Wekre A.G. continued to flourish, owing to its free labor 
supply … benefitting from economic reserves and production capacity that had, in 
large part, been derived from the work of unpaid, forced laborers.’208   
Neuborne, for instance, merely paraphrased and generalized Iwanowa’s claims in testimony 
before Congress,209 alleging not only that MNCs had harmed the plaintiffs (something beyond 
dispute), but also that human rights violations had formed the foundation of Germany’s post-war 
economic boom.  
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Judge Greenaway recognized slavery as a universally proscribed violation of 
international law, qualifying for jurisdiction under ATCA, but he disposed of Iwanowa’s 
wrongful enrichment claim incident to the “inhuman conditions at Fordwerke” on three different 
grounds.210  First he concluded that her claims were barred by various reparations treaties that 
provided for peace after World War II, especially the London Debt Agreement of 1953.211  
Second, Greenaway found that claims for war reparations were non-justiciable because they 
touched upon policies constitutionally committed to the political branches.  Moreover, the U.S. 
government as well as other foreign powers had expressly reserved these matters for 
government-to-government negotiations at the conclusion of World War II.212 
Finally, Greenaway found that restitution claims against American Ford were time 
barred.213  Iwanowa had filed her suit in March, 1998, over fifty years after the events for which 
she sought recovery.  She argued that various post-war treaties had tolled the statutes of 
limitations relevant to her cause.  An analysis of these treaties is beyond the scope of this essay, 
but the parties stipulated to Iwanowa’s argument that the limitation had tolled from 1945 until 
1991, when the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic German Republic concluded 
the treaty that reunified Germany (the “Two-Plus-Four” treaty, entered into effect March 15, 
1991).214  Nevertheless, Greenaway found that the maximum statute of limitations was six years, 
even after granting a tolling of forty-six years and regardless of whether one applied the law of 
Germany (residence of Ford-Werke), Michigan (headquarters of American Ford), or Delaware 
(place of Ford’s incorporation). 
As discussed above, the survivors’ most meritorious claims in quantum meruit could 
potentially yield large recoveries, but only because of the time value of money.  The short statute 
of limitations usually imposed on quantum meruit recovery is another factor suggesting that the 
43 
 
Holocaust-era suits will be poor models for other human rights litigation.  Another suit very 
similar to Iwanowa’s also found that Holocaust-era slave-labor suits were time barred (applying 
California law).215  These cases suggest that any contemporary plaintiffs seeking recovery of 
wages lost due to the wrong of slavery must bring their claims quickly.  But without the accrual 
of multiple decades of prejudgment interest, recovery will be very limited (see supra, Section 
II(a)). 
Greenaway came to the issue of justiciability last and declared that the Constitution 
committed both war and foreign affairs to the political branches.  After reviewing contemporary 
and historical statements made by the states party to World War II, Greenaway also concluded 
that they intended to settle the claims of their nationals in government-to-government 
negotiations.216  Contravening this intent would risk embarrassing a coordinate branch of 
government.217   
Other courts have criticized this aspect of the Iwanowa decision.  In an opinion 
interpreted by some as rejecting it,218 the 9th Circuit warned that courts following Greenaway’s 
analysis might convert “every dispute over the proper application of a treaty into a political 
question, because treaties inherently involve foreign affairs.”219  This mischaracterizes the 
Iwanowa opinion, in which Greenaway limited discussion of the political questions doctrine to 
war reparations.220  Furthermore, his dismissal for non-justiciability was redundant and merely 
reinforced a careful analysis of post-war treaties.  By finding multiple grounds for dismissal, the 
court underscored the weakness of Holocaust-era restitution claims.  Iwanowa could not survive 
dismissal and the New Jersey District Court never addressed the factual merits. 
In the parallel case to Iwanowa, the Degussa plaintiffs fared no better in an opinion 
issued by Judge Dickinson Debevoise on the same day.  Their slave labor and tort claims were 
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almost identical.  The Degussa plaintiffs sought to recover for common-law torts of assault and 
battery, wrongful death, and false imprisonment.  They also sued to recover the value of their 
forced labor in quantum meruit as well as the wrongful enrichment earned from that labor, the 
sale of Zyklon B, and the looting of dental gold.221  As remedy, they sought “disgorgement of 
illicit profits”222 and “a constructive trust upon all assets … traceable to the systematic use of 
slave labor, together with reasonable interest thereon.”223   
The constructive trust is a remedy for wrongful enrichments dating back to 19th century 
courts of equity.224 It entitles the plaintiff to the assets gained in a wrongful enrichment as if the 
defendant held them in trust from the moment of misappropriation.  Like other restitution 
remedies, however, it does not entitle even the most deserving plaintiffs to profits or proceeds 
indiscriminately, only those traceable to the wrongful enrichment.  Neither Siemens nor Degussa 
would have been liable for profits earned from industrial units that did not use slave labor.  A 
defendant may raise the defense of remoteness and may retain proportional profits if he can show 
that his own assets are comingled with ill-gotten gains.225  Even in uncomplicated industrial 
processes, the contribution of labor to profits is difficult to trace.  Defendants can also avail 
themselves of the change of position defense, that is, by showing that they actually earned no 
profits.  Both corporations could have escaped liability for unprofitable slave-labor enterprises 
regardless of the victims’ suffering. 
As with restitutionary claims generally, the plaintiffs’ quantum meruit and wrongful 
enrichment claims were weaker in comparison to traditional tort or contract claims for damages.  
Any demonstrable tie to identifiable assets (such as Degussa’s macabre trade in dental gold) 
would have strengthened them, but, at trial, the Degussa plaintiffs abandoned their common law 
tort claims and claims to the restitution of looted property.  Instead, they invoked wrongful 
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enrichments in “the wealth of the corporations which benefited from their participation in the 
Nazi persecution."226  Debevoise therefore focused on these claims.227  
Judge Debevoise dismissed Degussa on the same day as Judge Greenaway dismissed 
Iwanowa, 13 September 1999. 228  Using very similar reasoning, Debevoise found that the 
Constitution firmly commits the negotiation of war reparations to the political branches of 
government.  "Reparations were but one facet of an extraordinarily critical series of negotiations 
concerning the future of a war-devastated Europe … Were the court to undertake to fashion 
appropriate reparations for the plaintiffs in the present case, it would lack any standards to 
apply."229  In sum, both the Degussa plaintiffs and Iwanowa faltered as all previous Holocaust-
era plaintiffs had done since the Bernstein cases: on political questions, issues of state 
sovereignty, and technicalities such as the statute of limitations. 
Neuborne believed that “the erroneous … decisions of the District Court [of New Jersey] 
in dismissing the slave labor claims as time-barred and nonjusticiable [in Iwanowa and Burger-
Fischer] eroded the bargaining position of counsel, reducing the sums ultimately available to 
victims by as much as DM 5 billion.”230  However, Judge Debevoise believed that “the best thing 
that ever happened to the plaintiffs was losing in the District of New Jersey because it introduced 
a note of realism to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, so they would listen to those who were working on 
the settlement.”231 
The plaintiffs’ lawyers undoubtedly overestimated the strength of their claims, which 
would have fared little better on the factual merits.  For instance, far from being a major 
beneficiary of the Nazi war economy, the Nazis repeatedly discriminated against Ford-Werke in 
favor of German auto manufacturers and had marginalized it by the end of the war.232  By side-
lining a formidable competitor, this may have contributed to the rise of German auto companies 
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after the war.233  But this is not to say that Ford-Werke ceased operations.  Its Cologne plant 
employed slave laborers from April 1942 until the utter collapse of Nazi Germany, peaking at 
1,932 out of a total of over 5,000 employees (ca: 37.1%).234 
When Iwanowa sued, the Ford Motor Works hired a team of historians and social 
scientists as well as the accounting firm Price Waterhouse Cooper to translate “the vagaries of … 
sixty-year-old German accounting entries and techniques into modern auditing methods.”235  The 
team found that Ford-Werke had paid no dividends from 1939 to the end of the war, and the 
balance of evidence suggested that “neither the American parent company nor the German 
subsidiary benefitted financially” from slave labor.236  This does not suggest that Iwanowa and 
similarly situated plaintiffs deserved no remedy for their suffering.  But the disjunction between 
their harm and the meager remedy in wrongful enrichment is precisely the point:  Gross 
violations of human rights are not particularly profitable.  Therefore legal theories that depend 
upon an imagined nexus between human-rights abuses and lucre will usually fail.  
The historical record yields more support for the wrongful enrichment claims of the 
Degussa plaintiffs.  Degussa (an acronym for the German Gold and Silver Refinery Joint Stock 
Company) was Nazi Germany’s central processor for looted dental gold and other precious 
metals, and there can be no question that the firm took part in the most horrendous crimes of 
spoliation.  One Degussa employee reported on German television in 1998:  
The crowns and the bridges, there were those where the teeth were still 
attached....That was the most depressing … It was probably just like it had been 
when broken out of a mouth.  The teeth were still there and sometimes still bloody 
and with pieces of gum on them.237 
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Unlike Ford, Degussa’s profits rose during the war, especially during the Holocaust.238  Like 
many German firms hit by litigation, the company hired an experienced business historian, 
Northwestern University Professor Peter Hayes, to vet its record of Nazi-era transactions.   
Hayes delved into the most grisly aspect of Degussa’s business, its trade in dental gold 
pried from the mouths of murdered Jews.  Bloody and putrefying dental work arrived at 
Degussa’s facilities by the crate load from 1942-1944 at precisely the time that proceeds from 
refining and smelting rocketed up (17% in 1942 and another 18% in 1943).239  Nevertheless, 
these morally reprehensible transactions represented one of the firm’s least lucrative segments, 
generating a mere 6% of Degussa’s precious metals business.240  “[I]t would appear that 
Degussa’s gross profits from the plundering of the Jews … came to a minimum of around 2 
million Reichsmark” (about $8 million in 2000 U.S. dollars, in other words, scarcely more than a 
dollar per each victim of the Holocaust).241  The quantities of dental fillings, gold wire-rimmed 
glasses, jewelry, and other personal keepsakes required to create such a sum beggars the 
imagination yet falls far short of the billions demanded in the Holocaust-era lawsuits.  The sums 
would have been ridiculously small in comparison to the magnitude of the victims’ devastation. 
The wrongful enrichment claim arising from slave labor was far weaker, subject to the 
usual defenses of remoteness and proportional accounting.  Inexplicably, the plaintiffs 
concentrated on this, rather than on restitution of identifiable assets, and the record is silent as to 
why.  But Judge Debevoise noted that “The briefs, exhibits and oral arguments have addressed 
almost exclusively the claims on behalf of slave laborers, barely mentioning the claims relating 
to the refining of the seized gold and to the manufacture of Zyklon B … Disposition of the 
forced labor claims will govern disposition of the other claims.”242   
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Hayes’ research revealed that lower labor costs due to slave labor, combined with a firm-
wide push for efficiency, did contribute something to profits.  “But to what degree is 
unknowable” and “the sums that result from such calculations are startlingly small when set 
against the corporation’s overall earnings.”243  Finally, the firm could have also raised the usual 
defense of remoteness or embroiled the court in calculations alleging that its investments of 
capital and managerial skill had produced the gains, not slave labor. 
c) The U.S.-German Executive Agreement and the “Anti-Bernstein” Letter 
of Interest 
Given the weaknesses of the restitutionary claims, it is unsurprising that the slave-labor 
litigation against German MNCs reached settlement in diplomatic channels outside the 
courtroom.  Stuart Eizenstat brokered a 10 billion Deutschmark deal sealed by an Executive 
Agreement between President Clinton and Chancellor Gerhard Schöder of Germany, signed July 
17, 2000.  This established the German Foundation, to which German industry and the German 
government each agreed to contribute half the total sum.  In exchange the Germans insisted upon 
“legal peace.”244  In other words, similar to a settlement-only class action, the defendants wished 
to bind all plaintiffs to the deal in order to extinguish any similar future claims.245 
This requirement led to what might be called the “anti-Bernstein” letter.  It is long 
established precedent that the federal government has the authority to settle the private claims of 
its nationals when these are essential to foreign policy.246  President Clinton might have followed 
the example set by President Jimmy Carter, when he issued an executive order directing all 
claims of U.S. nationals against the Iranian government to be settled after the Iran hostage crisis 
in 1981.  The Supreme Court held that the President had the authority to direct the settlement of 
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U.S. nationals against Iranian nationals as well and not only the Iranian state.247  But President 
Clinton hesitated to settle the Holocaust-era litigation by executive order in any similar way.248 
Nor did the Clinton  seek a congressional-executive agreement by passing and signing 
legislation, much less a formal bilateral treaty.  By contrast, the German Bundestag backed 
Chancellor Schröder with its full authority by passing legislation formally establishing the 
German Foundation as sole remedy for restitutionary claims against German companies arising 
out of World War II.  Despite extensive involvement of U.S. politicians in the House and Senate 
(dating to Alfonse D’Amato’s personal interest in the Swiss bank litigation), President Clinton 
did not seek approval of the German Foundation in Congress.  Instead, he pledged the U.S. to 
submit “letters of interest” to the courts clearly stating that it was “in the foreign policy interest 
of the United States” for the German Foundation to provide exclusive remedy for all claims 
arising against German companies as a result of World War II.249  These letters concluded by 
requesting United States courts to dismiss Holocaust-era suits “on any valid legal ground.”250 
Fifty years earlier, the Executive had used “Bernstein letters” to clearly express U.S. 
foreign policy interests in allowing suits to proceed, even when courts would have otherwise 
dismissed them under the Act of State Doctrine.  The Clinton-era letters expressed the 
unambiguous interest of the Federal government in dismissing suits.  These letters had the 
desired effect.  In subsequent slave-labor restitution cases, they have led to dismissal.  As with 
the Bernstein cases, U.S. courts have followed the Executive’s lead.  
The case of Frumkin v. J.A. Jones, 129 F. Supp. 370 (C.D. Cal 2001) illustrates this 
point.  Simon Frumkin sued a German company and its two U.S. subsidiaries for the value of his 
slave labor in quantum meruit and the wrongful death of his father.  Dissatisfied with the 
Executive Agreement of 2000, he argued that his case could not be dismissed notwithstanding 
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the German Foundation as an alternative remedy.  The federal government submitted a “letter of 
interest” urging dismissal on “any valid legal ground,” but Frumkin argued that the Executive 
could not be allowed to unilaterally extinguish his claims.  This, he alleged, would constitute an 
unlawful taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Finally, Frumkin maintained 
that his claims could not be dismissed as a political question, because he had brought suit against 
a private corporation only, not a foreign state or political entity.251 
Judge William Bassler disposed of Frumkin’s Fifth Amendment claim, holding that the 
Executive had proposed no property taking and no 5th Amendment violation.  “Rather than 
extinguish the claims pending in this Court by treaty or executive agreement, the government 
leaves it to the Court to dismiss.”252  Judge Bassler then dismissed the rest of Frumkin’s suit 
under the political questions doctrine after invoking the Executive letter of interest and finding a 
non-justiciable question of foreign policy.  In particular, the letter demonstrated that allowing 
Frumkin to proceed would 1) contravene stated policy determinations; 2) lead to multiple policy 
determinations by coordinate branches of government; and 3) risk embarrassment to a coordinate 
branch of government.  Finally, because the letter identified “the United States’ strong interests 
in the success of the Foundation”253 and because that success depended upon the dismissal of the 
suit, Bassler indicated that dismissal served U.S. foreign policy interests, which the Constitution 
committed to the Executive, not the judiciary. 254   
If the U.S. judiciary was not exactly taking “marching orders” from the federal 
government, it proved very pliant in cases like Frumkin.255  But this fit the pattern of Holocaust-
era litigation throughout the post-war era.  Holocaust-era restitution suits had never been able to 
survive dismissal without the support of the political branches.  President Clinton’s letters of 
interest made already tenuous suits nearly impossible. 
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Section IV: The Poverty of Unjust Enrichment in International Human Rights Torts  
Plaintiffs in human-rights litigation continue to rely upon theories of restitution which 
seemed to succeed so spectacularly in the Holocaust-era cases, but typically these litigants 
continue to make the same mistakes.  They advance claims to profits or constructive trusts in 
wrongful enrichment based on the belief that human-rights violations profited MNCs, but they 
usually fail to advance arguments connecting specific wrongs to the alleged enrichments they 
seek to recover.256  As an example, this section explores Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, 504 
F. 3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), a consolidation of ten class actions against fifty international 
corporations and banks that participated in apartheid South Africa.257   
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, 504 F. 3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) shared much in common 
with the Holocaust-era litigation, especially its historical scope and complexity.  Like the 
Holocaust-era litigants of the late 1990s, plaintiffs sought damages in U.S. federal courts for 
harms suffered on the other side of the globe under a regime that had, thankfully, passed into 
history.  Many of the same plaintiffs’ attorneys took a leading role in both litigations, especially 
Michael Hausfeld and Edward Fagan.258  Khulumani therefore illustrates how attorneys fared 
when they sought to extend the model of the Holocaust-era litigation to other international 
human rights lawsuits.259   
Khulumani consolidated ten class actions, representing millions of South Africans who 
suffered under apartheid, including 91 named victims of arbitrary detention, sexual assault, 
extrajudicial killings, and other violence.260  Defendants were fifty MNCs that conducted 
business in apartheid-era South Africa as well as “hundreds of ‘corporate Does’ [who] the 
plaintiffs argue … actively and willingly collaborated with the government of South Africa in 
maintaining a repressive, racially based system known as ‘apartheid,’ which restricted the 
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majority black African population in all areas of life while providing benefits for the minority 
white population.”261  If successful, their sweeping claims against hundreds of “corporate Does” 
could potentially implicate almost any MNC doing business with South Africa in the latter half 
of the 20th century.  Legal scholars have focused on the controversial per curium decision of the 
Second Circuit, which found that aiding and abetting liability can lie for MNCs that substantially 
assist the perpetrators of crimes universally proscribed under international law.262  To date, no 
scholarship has addressed the restitutionary theories that the plaintiff’s modeled directly on the 
Holocaust-era lawsuits. 
The first apartheid-era suit was filed in the Eastern District of New York soon after the 
settlement of the Holocaust claims, on 12 Nov. 2002.263  Others followed in eight different 
federal courts.  The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation eventually transferred and 
consolidated them in the Southern District of New York under Judge John Sprizzo.  Edward 
Fagan’s 2nd Consolidated & Amended Complaint tried to make a direct connection between 
MNCs’ role in the Holocaust and their role in South Africa,264 clearly hoping that the court 
would look to the Holocaust-era litigation as a precedent.  The complaint also tried to extend 
wrongful enrichment claims modeled on those of Holocaust survivors, alleging that defendants 
had benefited from forced labor265 and asking for “disgorgement of illicit profits.”266  Plaintiffs 
requested $400 billion, $100 billion more than South Africa’s total GDP in 2007.267 
To sustain a wrongful enrichment claim, plaintiffs must first demonstrate a wrong, and 
Khulumani grouped allegations of torture, extra-judicial killing, and other torts, as well as 
criminal contracts under TVPA, RICO, and ATCA.  Judge Sprizzo dismissed all of these charges 
on a 12 (b)(1) motion, finding no jurisdiction to hear any claims.  The Torture Victim Prevention 
Act (TVPA) creates a cause of action in Federal court for the victims of torture and extrajudicial 
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killings.  These are limited to individuals who act “under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
law, of any foreign nation.”268  It also requires that victims exhaust all alternative remedies 
before coming into American federal court.269  Judge Sprizzo found none of these prerequisites 
satisfied.270  The court also found the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO)271 to operate extraterritorially only in the event that the alleged harmful conduct either 
occurred in the United States or had a direct and substantial effect in the United States.  Finding 
insufficient contacts, the court dismissed these claims too, adding that “this [RICO] claim 
borders on the frivolous.”272   
Finally, the court dismissed the ATCA claims.  Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), Sprizzo noted that ATCA only provided a cause 
of action for violations of international law "defined with a specificity comparable to the features 
of the 18th-century paradigms” at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the 
ATCA.273  These were few, namely piracy, offenses against ambassadors, and the violation of 
safe conducts.  Sprizzo did not like the expansion of human-rights litigation to encompass new 
offenses such as torture, genocide, or slavery and regretted that “it would have been 
unquestionably preferable for the lower federal courts if the Supreme Court had created a bright-
line rule that limited the ATCA to those violations of international law clearly recognized at the 
time of its enactment.”274  In dicta, he expressed his opinion that the inclusion of human-rights 
norms in ATCA jurisdiction made the matter “ripe for non-meritorious and blunderbuss suits.”275 
The court held that the mere conduct of business with South Africa did not meet the Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain standard as a violation of “a norm of international character.”276  Sprizzo 
acknowledged the restitution claims only once,277 but did nothing more to address them. 
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The restitution claims were simply ignored, not least because of their weak basis in 
evidence.  The plaintiffs briefed it once again on appeal: “Like Nazi-era firms that profited from 
forced labor during World War Two, defendants actively sought cooperation with the regime to 
secure profits.”278  Again the plaintiffs failed to allege any specific events or operations that had 
led to calculable gains on behalf of MNCs.  On appeal, the Second Circuit ignored both the 
plaintiffs’ quantum meruit claims arising from “near-enslavement”279 and their wrongful 
enrichment claims.  The opinion simply does not mention them. 
To sustain their quantum meruit claim to the market value of labor, the plaintiffs would 
have had to show that MNCs either did not compensate them or undercompensated them.  The 
basis for comparison, however, would have been similarly-situated workers in Africa, 
accompanied by evidence that wages were depressed or unpaid by South African MNCs as 
opposed to elsewhere.  An argument could plausibly be made, for instance, that white wages in 
South African mines were 4.4 times that of black African workers whereas in Namibia they were 
“only” roughly three times higher.280  The Khulumani plaintiffs might have argued that they were 
entitled to the difference.  They would have encountered difficulties laying claim to “white” 
wages, unless the work performed was substantially similar.  Unskilled workers are not entitled 
in quantum meruit to the wages of skilled workers, for instance.  Whether broad sociological and 
economic arguments of this nature could ever sustain restitution suits is questionable and beyond 
the scope of this article.  What is relevant here is that the Khulumani plaintiffs did not make 
allegations approaching even this level of specificity. 
To sustain their wrongful enrichment claims, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that 
intentional wrongdoing had directly enriched the defendants.  MNCs would have all the defenses 
at their disposal discussed above.  But Khulumani merely alleged that vague “cooperation” of 
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MNCs with “the regime” had “secure[d] profits.”  None of these allegations possessed merit 
sufficient to prompt the court to address them.  The Second Circuit’s per curiam opinion touched 
upon ill-gotten “financial gain” only once, but in the most unflattering light for the plaintiffs.  
Judge Edward Korman’s dissent favorably quoted South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry 
Alec Erwin, who derided “attempts to use unsound extra-territorial legal precepts in the United 
States of America to seek personal financial gain in South Africa.”281  At least in Minister 
Erwin’s opinion, the only cause advanced by wrongful enrichment claims was that of the 
American plaintiffs’ bar. 
As the South African Trade Minister’s objection made clear, Khulumani lacked any 
support from the political branches of either South Africa or the United States.  Both 
governments roundly condemned the litigation, arguing that it threatened the fragile stability of 
South Africa’s transitional regime.282  Far from heroic lawyers prodding states to act through 
“Plaintiffs’ Diplomacy,” the Khulumani litigants secured only official condemnation.283  
Ironically, the Khulumani court conformed to one of the strongest precedents set by the 
Holocaust-era restitution cases: even strong international human-rights suits can fail without 
political support and almost inevitably fail in the face of political opposition. 
On remand, Judge Shira Scheindlin decided the case on April 8, 2009, now under  the 
name Ntzebeza v. Daimler A.G..284  She faced the daunting task of divining standards for aiding 
and abetting liability under ATCA from the Second Circuit’s per curiam decision in Khulumani.  
Judge Robert Katzmann had looked to international law standards; Judge Peter Hall to common-
law tort; and Judge Edward Korman looked to international law but wrote that it provided little 
clarity and urged dismissal on prudential grounds.285  Like Judge Korman, Judge Scheindlin 
found international legal standards uncertain286 but nevertheless saw a common denominator, 
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concluding “that customary international law requires that an aider and abettor know that its 
actions will substantially assist the perpetrator in the commission of a crime or tort in violation of 
the law of nations.”287  The motives of the perpetrator and aider and abettor MNCs need not 
therefore be aligned in a common criminal enterprise.  It would suffice that the MNC knew or 
should have known that a crime would occur and lent substantial assistance to the criminal. 
Scheindlin limited this standard, by imposing strict actus reus requirements.  “Simply 
doing business with a state or individual who violates the law of nations is insufficient,”288  she 
wrote, excluding the mere extension of financing or the sale of commodities.289  She required 
plaintiffs to delve into the facts of their cases.  To prove liability for aiding and abetting, they 
must show that defendants “specifically designed” their merchandise or services to contribute to 
human rights violations.  They must also demonstrate a “close causal connection to the principal 
crime.”290  While she expressed doubt about whether The Ntzebeza/Khulumani allegations could 
prevail at trial,291 she allowed the suit to proceed on these limited grounds on the strength of 
plaintiffs’ pleadings tying specific products such as weapons292 or data-processing technology293 
to specific acts of torture, extrajudicial killing committed by the apartheid regime.  But she 
dismissed other claims for insufficient factual detail294 and dismissed all claims against financial 
institutions that had merely provided funding but otherwise remained distant from the criminal 
acts alleged by the plaintiffs.295 
Judge Scheindlin’s opinion suggests that future courts will redouble their attention to 
well-pled facts.  Breezy allegations that a defendant sought to “acquire a stake in a criminal 
venture” or had simply profited by dealing with a regime cannot carry the burden of proof in 
international human-rights litigation.296  The case also demonstrates that the restitutionary 
theories of the Holocaust-era litigation were of no use to the plaintiffs.  They had disappeared 
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from the case on remand.  Khulumani’s First Amended Complaint dropped them entirely and 
instead asked for relief in the form of damages only.297  Scheindlin also dismissed claims against 
Barclays Bank for its employment practices, casting doubt on whether the court would entertain 
even well-pled quantum meruit claims.298  Considering that the ATCA’s plain language extends 
jurisdiction for “torts only,” it is doubtful whether courts will ever find jurisdiction to rule on 
restitutionary claims arising from those torts.299 
This article has argued that governments are decisive in human-rights litigation.  Yet the 
Ntzebeza ruling contravened the express opposition of the United States Executive, the 
government of South Africa as well as the governments of Germany, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland.300  Scheindlin’s opinion therefore seems to temper one of this 
article’s central theses.  Yet one factor distinguishes Ntzebeza.  The plaintiffs produced 
statements of interest by the Commissioners of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its 
chairman Desmond Tutu, who wrote that “absolutely nothing in the TRC [Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission] process, its goals, or the pursuit of the overarching goal of 
reconciliation, linked with truth … would be impeded by this litigation.  To the contrary, such 
litigation is entirely consistent with these policies...”301  The institutions of the South African 
government thus do not currently speak with one voice on the matter.  There is also much 
speculation about the stance that the new Obama administration will take.302  It may be that the 
plaintiffs are securing political support, which they will need to prevail.   
Furthermore, cases like that of Hugo Princz also survived dismissal in the trial court only 
to fail on appeal.  Whether Ntzebeza will follow the pattern of Princz is yet to be determined, but 
the Supreme Court is very likely to weigh in, whatever the Second Circuit eventually rules.  In 
2008 it declined to hear Khulumani only because the Court lacked a quorum after four justices 
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recused themselves because they owned stock in various companies among the 51 MNC 
defendants.303  Now that the number of defendants is considerably fewer, the Supreme Court 
seems likely to accept a petition for certiorari, and it has already expressed itself regarding 
Khulumani in Sosa: “In such cases, there is a strong argument that federal courts should give 
serious weight to the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy.”304   
It is therefore far too early to judge whether Ntzebeza will actually alter standards of 
deference to the express interests of the United States and foreign governments in such suits.  
Whatever the future holds, the theories of restitution that enthusiasts of the Holocaust-era 
litigation hoped might form a model for future human-rights litigation contributed little to the 
success Ntzebeza.  The plaintiffs abandoned the restitutionary claims.  To the extent they have 
prevailed, they have concentrated on allegations that fit the historical facts. 
Conclusion 
In retrospect, it is small wonder that experienced executives and lawyers representing 
defendant German MNCs in the Holocaust-era litigation “had never given much credence to the 
legal case against them.”305  Their skepticism should serve as a warning that wrongful 
enrichment theories offer few advantages in international human rights litigation.  Gross 
violations of human rights are not notable for their profitability.  Where slavery still flourishes in 
an industrial setting, it remains marginal and overwhelmingly associated with sweat shops rather 
than MNC enterprise.306  Even if plaintiffs can recover in quantum meruit, the sums involved 
must be measured by prevailing lawful market wages where the crimes took place.  In places like 
Sudan this can be less than a dollar a day. 
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Restitution has never been a legal remedy for harms inflicted by a wrong; it is a remedy 
to recover benefits conferred by the wrong.  Its usual purpose is to allow a plaintiff to recover ill-
gotten gains when these are larger than the damage she has suffered.307  Because it is not a 
punitive remedy, however, it is powerless to serve the cause of justice when ill-gotten gains are 
non-existent or meager in comparison to the harm.  Most gross infractions of human rights are 
instances of the latter rather than the former. 
It is hard to imagine venture capitalists rushing to invest in widespread and systematic 
genocide, enslavement, murder, torture, rape, or disappearances because there is little lucre to be 
gained.308  Corporations have sought profit through transactions with criminal states, and 
corporate revenues have undoubtedly lent crucial resources to the most egregious regimes.309  
But criminal regimes typically seek the revenue generated by MNCs to fund widespread and 
systematic attacks upon civilians; MNCs do not seek human-rights depredations to generate 
revenue.  Historically, this was the role played by Germany’s leading MNCs in the Holocaust.  
They lent willing and eager assistance but were not the authors of the Nazis’ worst excesses.   
Human rights plaintiffs will succeed only with theories anchored in evidence, as 
demonstrated by the Khulumani suit.  As it evolved, the plaintiffs jettisoned Holocaust-era 
restitution theories and instead focused on claims based in aiding and abetting liability.  These 
more closely fit the facts.  Contemporary corporations are more likely to appear in the role of 
aiders and abettors who render “substantial assistance or encouragement,” rather than marauding 
institutions that violate human rights due to simple-minded greed.310 
The Khulumani plaintiffs sought to suggest that Holocaust-era corporations have their 
counterparts in the present, and in this they hit on a kernel of the truth.  For example, during the 
acquisition of a subsidiary in 1998, the Canadian company Talisman discovered that its oil-field 
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development in southern Sudan "would increase Government oil revenues and tip the military 
balance [in the midst of civil war] in the Sudan in favor of the Government."311  Litigation 
against Talisman yielded clear evidence that the company owned a minority position in a 
consortium, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company Ltd.  Greater Nile lent knowing 
assistance to the Sudanese regime, which used the oil company’s airfields, roads, and other 
resources to conduct ethnic cleansing.312   
But Talisman illustrates once again the more typical role of profit-seeking corporations in 
gross human rights violations.  There was and is strong evidence that the militant Islamic-Arabic 
state of Sudan perpetrated war crimes, disappearances, and the forced relocation of Christian and 
animist populations in Southern Sudan.  But it was the mutual interest in the development of an 
economic resource—in this case oil—that connected the MNC to the criminal regime.  MNCs 
wanted to profit from the oil fields.  The Sudanese government wanted to transform that resource 
into revenue in pursuit of its ideological and political aims.  The motives of the two parties were 
clearly distinct but mutually reinforcing.  Nevertheless, little evidence suggests that MNCs 
profited directly from the wrongs of the regime. 
Wrongful enrichment is a poor legal theory for establishing MNCs’ liability to the 
victims in such cases.  In an ongoing lawsuit, the Talisman plaintiffs belatedly included a 
demand for “restitution and disgorgement of the revenues and profits obtained by Defendants as 
a result of the actions described herein and a declaration that such revenues and profits are held 
in constructive trust for the benefit of the Class.”313  But despite detailed findings gained through 
discovery, they offered no evidence that war crimes, slavery, disappearances, and relocations had 
conferred benefits upon any corporations involved.314  Rather detailed allegations concentrated 
on how oil revenue had increased the deadly force available to the Sudanese military.315  Relief 
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should be available in American courts for the harm done in such cases, but legal theories will be 
strongest when they accurately incorporate historical fact and credible evidence rather than 
speculation about “enormous profits.” 
The Holocaust-era cases of the late 1990s have had few progeny.  Despite their 
spectacular settlements, they are a legal cul-de-sac.316 Charges that MNCs engorged their balance 
sheets during the Holocaust proved sensational enough and the historical abomination of the 
Nazi regime proved potent enough that law professors and plaintiffs’ attorneys could testify 
about such things with little knowledge, even before congress, without really being challenged.  
The plaintiffs themselves were also sympathetic, articulate, and their historical suffering beyond 
question.  In consequence, they gained widespread political support.  But it was backing from the 
Executive and Congress that led to the large settlements, not the merits of the litigation. 
The Khulumani and Saleh class actions suggest that future plaintiffs are unlikely to 
garner this kind of a “perfect storm” of support.  Human rights litigation is a weapon of the 
weak.  Aliens who come to American courts to sue their oppressors can very rarely count upon 
rich or well-connected allies such as Edgar Bronfman, Alan Hevesi, President Clinton, Stuart 
Eizenstat, or Alfonse D’Amato.  The only leverage that victims may have in the pursuit of justice 
is the truth of their allegations.  This is all the more reason why human-rights plaintiffs should 
take care not to distort history.  It should not be forgotten that those who manipulate the truth 
about the Holocaust—in the name of whatever political cause—will quickly find themselves in 
the most bizarre of company.317  Litigation that exaggerates the truth or even fabricates history to 
score political advantage may, in the long run, undermine the credibility of international human-
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